Year of Accomplishments

Krasnaya zvezda called this story “Year of Accomplishments,” but might have called it Day of Military Acceptance . . . .

President and Supreme CINC Vladimir Putin visited the NTsUO for the first time on 18 December.  He familiarized himself with the new national command center and its capabilities for accommodating and coordinating the work of the military and other high-level government organs.

Putin Touring the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

Putin Touring the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

Putin’s seat is in the upper balcony opposite the big screens.

Another View of the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

Another View of the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

The first real order of business, however, was reviewing fulfillment of the State Defense Order in 2014.

Recall this year the political leadership and Defense Ministry launched a quarterly exercise of enumerating what was procured the previous three months on what they call the Day of Military Acceptance (День военной приёмки).

It’s almost as though the Kremlin is irritated someone has audaciously suggested that Russian output of new armaments and other military equipment hasn’t been especially impressive in years past.  

The Supreme CINC said:

“At recent meetings in Sochi we already noted that practically all Gosoboronzakaz tasks for this year have been fulfilled, and its general volume increased by almost half in comparison with 2013.”

Putin went on to say that 4,500 weapons, military, and special equipment were acquired in 2014, including:

  • 142 aircraft;
  • 135 helicopters;
  • 4 submarines;
  • 15 surface ships and boats / craft;
  • 19 SAM systems;
  • 590 tanks and BMPs;
  • 3 Yars ICBM regiments;
  • 7 modernized Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers.

It isn’t clear which four submarines the Russian president means.  Probably the third Borey-class (proyekt 955A) SSBN Vladimir Monomakh and Improved Kilo-class (proyekt 636.3) diesel-electric Novorossiysk.  But Borey unit 2 Aleksandr Nevskiy was accepted late last year.  And it would be a stretch to accept the next two Improved Kilos before January.

KZ then turns to Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu and his words before an expanded MOD collegium in the NTsUO.

He said Russian strategic forces received 38 intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2014 — 16 ICBMs and 22 SLBMs — most of the latter placed on Borey unit 1 Yuriy Dolgorukiy.  He claimed that 56 percent of Russia’s strategic weapons are now “modern.”

Shoygu said Russia’s 14 UAV sub-units (companies or platoons) received 179 UAVs.

He expounded a bit on the Supreme CINC:

“The Ground Troops were supplied with two brigade sets of operational-tactical missile systems ‘Iskander-M,’ 294 modernized tanks, 296 other armored combat vehicles, two ‘S-300V4′ Ground Troops air defense systems, almost 5 thousand vehicles.”

“The Air Forces received 142 aircraft, of which 53 are multipurpose Su-30 and Su-35S aircraft systems, 16 Su-34, 28 transport and training aircraft of various types, 18 modernized fighter-interceptors MiG-31BM, 135 helicopters, including 46 combat and 72 transports.”

Mil.ru posted the videos and texts presented to Putin and the collegium.  They address all of the priority tasks of the military this year.  One, of course, is “Equipping with Modern Armaments and Military Equipment.”  It provides the following data (different from Putin and Shoygu):

  • 294 modernized T-72B3;
  • 7 S-400 SAM systems;
  • Yasen-class SSN Severodvinsk (accepted in 2013?!@#) ;
  • Novorossiysk;
  • 5 surface ships and 10 boats / craft of various classes.

This account mentions that the serviceability of weapons and equipment rose from 80 to 85 percent.

Accepting submarines at year’s end seems to enable Moscow to claim that they were accepted, or to count them as “produced,” in two years rather than just one.

All in all, more weapons and equipment were acquired in 2014 and 2013 than in 2012, 2011, etc.  But it’s a little like comparing something and nothing. Serious procurement on a fairly wide front didn’t begin until after 2012.

The Most Recently Promoted

New Russian general and flag officer promotees have been added to the list. They show 12/13/2014 for a date of rank.  KZ ran a copy Putin’s ukaz.

Some notes:

  • The Pacific Fleet commander put on his third star.
  • Newly-minted General-Colonels Lentsov and Dvornikov look like possible candidates to command military districts / unified strategic commands in the future.
  • Four army commanders — Gurulev, Kaloyev, Kuralenko, and Teplinskiy — put on their second stars.
  • Chiefs of some specialized branches (comms, coastal defense, missile troops and artillery, air defense) got promoted.
  • RVSN, Airborne, VKO, Spetsnaz, and motorized rifle formation commanders got their first stars.
  • Friend-of-Putin and head of Russia’s military police Sidorkevich also got a star.

Item 30

PAK FA

PAK FA

HT to Militaryparitet.com for pointing to Lenta.ru on the status of work on PAK FA’s advanced “second phase” engine.

Lenta (citing Interfaks) says a source close to ODK General Director Vladislav Masalov says a PAK FA with the “second phase” engine will fly in 2017.

He reportedly said the “second phase” engine will replace “item 117″ and give PAK FA supercruise capability while being 15-18 percent more fuel efficient and cheaper to maintain.

Lenta notes the developmental engine is “item 30″ not “item 129″ as cited previously in Russian media.

The AL-41F1 is “item 117.”  Current PAK FA prototypes and the Su-35S have “item 117S” (AL-41F1S) engines.

Recall, in 2010, ODK along with NPO Saturn hoped the “second phase” engine would fly by 2015.  However, OAK President Pogosyan was considerably less sanguine, saying that the advanced engine might come in 2019, or later.

What’s It Cost? (Addendum)

There’s reason this week to return to the issue of what the S-400 system costs. Specifically, what it might cost China.

Vedomosti reported Wednesday that Russia has signed a deal with China to sell it the S-400 / Triumf.

The business daily’s defense industry source claims the agreement inked by Rosoboroneksport and the Chinese military will send off not less than six battalions of the advanced SAM system for more than $3 billion.

That would be at least $500 million per battalion (against the previously ventured guess of about $320 million).  Or in excess of $80 million per TEL.

The Russian Defense Ministry has consistently maintained that the S-400 won’t go abroad before 2016.

Vedomosti notes China’s last big purchase was 15 battalions of S-300PMU-2 completed in 2010.

RIA Novosti pretty quickly reported that an official of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS) said an S-400 contract hadn’t been signed with China as yet.

Rosoboroneksport and Almaz-Antey just declined comment.

S-400 Deployments

S-400 Firing (photo: Interfaks-AVN / Andrey Stanavov)

S-400 Firing (photo: Interfaks-AVN / Andrey Stanavov)

Last week Interfaks-AVN wrote that the Russian military just received two “regimental sets” of S-400 / Triumf SAMs.  They make numbers seven and eight.

One became the fourth “regimental set” of the 4th Aerospace Defense Brigade around Moscow and the other is bound for the 1st Aerospace Defense Brigade on the Kola near Northern Fleet headquarters at Severomorsk.

The Kola brigade is the first in the Western MD to have the S-400.  It falls under the Western MD’s 1st Air Forces and Air Defense Command.

The other three of the eight are the 3rd (Kaliningrad), 7th (Novocherkassk), and 12th (Nakhodka) Aerospace Defense Brigades.

Almaz-Antey General Director Yan Novikov told the Interfaks-AVN that, for the first time, the Defense Ministry will get three S-400 “regiments” in a single year in 2014.

TASS reported even earlier last week that Almaz-Antey will deliver the ninth “regiment” will before the end of December.  It will be the first three-battalion regiment, and is destined for Kamchatka, or the 14th Aerospace Defense Brigade (Yelizovo).

In September, the commander of PVO and PRO for VVKO, General-Major Andrey Demin told TASS that 12 “regimental sets” of S-400 and 72 Pantsir-S would be procured by 2020.

Defense Sector Wages

Interesting item on wages in Russia’s defense industrial sector in NG on November 11.

Alina Terekhova reports average monthly pay in the OPK is 17 percent higher than the country as a whole.  However, defense industry salaries lag employee earnings in other key sectors (i.e. railroads, oil, finance).  Yet they are likely to grow while wages elsewhere will probably begin to fall.

Minpromtorg [rather optimistically] forecasts that the earnings of OPK workers will double over the coming five years.

Defense industry pay grew 13 percent last year [not entirely consistent with the table below] against almost 12 percent in other areas.

Average Pay in the OPK

Average Pay in the OPK

Earlier this year, workers in Russia’s mining industry made nearly 57,000 rubles per month, oil workers 83,000, railroads 41,000, and finance 67,000.  Pay in the defense industries averaged about 38,000 rubles per month during the first half of 2014, according to Rosstat.  Nationwide it was about 32,000.

That 38,000 seems to fit in the context of other salaries (e.g. 30-35,000 for junior officers and contractees).

Rising inflation, Terekhova reports, could reduce real earnings for everyone next year.

She quotes a couple experts, neither of whom expects a decline in OPK wages. Despite the stagnation evident in the economy, the Kremlin will likely continue funding the GOZ generously given increased tensions with the West.  This will keep upward pressure on defense sector salaries.

It’s interesting that the oft-mentioned “cadre famine” in defense industry hasn’t bid wages higher.  But some enterprises report the average age (and presumably the pay grade) of their workers is dropping with the arrival of new and younger employees.

The NTsUO Chief

The Defense Ministry announced in late October that Russia’s new National Defense Command and Control Center (NTsUO or НЦУО) in the old ground troops command building on Frunzenskaya embankment will be fully operational by December 1.  It has operated on an “experimental combat duty” basis since April.

You can read about the NTsUO here and here.  Or you can look at General Staff Chief Valeriy Gerasimov’s description of what it will do.  It’s an incredibly expansive list of oversight, monitoring, and decision-support functions for state defense in accord with the Defense Plan.  As Gerasimov indicates, the NTsUO will inform Russia’s leadership about what’s happening in the world, the country, and the Armed Forces, and propose alternative courses of action in response to changing situations.

The NTsUO will be the apex of the military command and control system. Military includes not just Defense Ministry forces, but also Russia’s numerous militarized ministries and agencies — FSB, FSO, SVR, MVD, MChS, etc.  And more besides.  But it’s not clear to what extent heavyweights like the FSB and MVD have invested themselves in the NTsUO thus far.

Overlooked in the NTsUO is an intent to give supreme commander-in-chief Vladimir Putin better control over his various siloviki in the event of a genuine internal threat to his rule, i.e. coup, “colored revolution,” Bolotnaya march, Maidan, etc.  The NTsUO appears to be something Gorbachev, Yeltsin, or even Yanukovych would have envied during their political crises.

The NTsUO and its chief may have usurped the role of spokesman for the MOD (which retains its official press-service).

Alongside Defense Minister Shoygu, newly-minted NTsUO chief, General-Lieutenant Mikhail Mizintsev took the lead in briefing the MOD’s Public Council on October 28.  His published report was widely replayed by Russian news agencies.

General-Lieutenant Mikhail Mizintsev (photo:  Mil.ru)

General-Lieutenant Mikhail Mizintsev (photo: Mil.ru)

So what about the NTsUO chief?

Mizintsev is a career staff officer with considerable time spent in tactical reconnaissance.  He was born in rural Vologda oblast on September 10, 1962.  He graduated from the Suvorov premilitary school in Tver in 1980, and the Kiev combined arms command school in 1984.

He commanded reconnaissance or motorized rifle troops up to battalion-level in the GSFG / WGF and Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus.

He finished the mid-career Frunze Military Academy in 1996, and served as a “senior officer-operator” [watch officer] in the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate (GOU) until 2001.  He returned to the schoolhouse and graduated from the senior-level General Staff Academy in 2003.

Mizintsev served as the chief of an unidentified GOU group through 2007. He then became chief of the operations directorate and deputy chief of staff for the Moscow Military District.  He likely came to the attention of Valeriy Gerasimov at this point.  Gerasimov commanded the district starting in 2009.

From 2010 to 2012, Mizintsev occupied the same post in the North Caucasus / Southern MD.

In August 2012, he became chief of the General Staff’s Central Command Post (TsKP or ЦКП) until it disbanded and he took over the NTsUO.

Mizintsev’s rise from O-6 was quick; he became a one-star in December 2011, then put on two-star general-lieutenant rank barely two years later.