Serdyukov Speaks to Investigators

Former Defense Minister Serdyukov apparently decided to speak to investigators last week, shifting his previous stance of taking the 51st or providing written statements.  Media outlets said the appearance of “new materials” caused the change in his tactics.

Last Monday, Newsru.com recapped a Kommersant story saying that Serdyukov’s signature was on documents transferring the Bolshoy Utrish property to his brother-in-law Valeriy Puzikov.  But investigators haven’t talked to the ex-minister about that case yet, which they say amounts to large-scale fraud by a group of conspirators.

Recall the Defense Ministry obtained this Black Sea coastal property near Anapa in 2010 to build a radar station, but, with the help of Yekaterina Smetanova, it was excessed for two-thirds of the military’s purchase price to Puzikov. 

According to Newsru.com from Tuesday, Serdyukov was called to the GVSU SKR to meet with investigators about the Zhitnoye dacha.  ITAR-TASS said he provided 11 pages of evidence, and claimed the Defense Ministry participated in this civilian project out of military “necessity.”

On Wednesday, Politkom.ru commentator Tatyana Stanovaya reported that the ex-Defense Minister talked to investigators for five hours.

She believes Putin doesn’t want Serdyukov to sit in jail, and anonymous media sources say he told SKR chief Aleksandr Bastrykin as much early on.  She sees it like this:

“It’s important for Putin to sort out the corruption cases, to intimidate the elite, but generally not to get worn out with real purges.  He recognizes corruption as an evil, but an unbeatable evil which is part of Russia’s historical tradition.  In other words, for Putin thievery is an insufficient basis for ‘sitting’ given the political loyalty of the ‘figure.’”

Bastrykin notwithstanding, the siloviki think they long since had enough evidence for Serdyukov’s prosecution. 

Stanovaya cites Kommersant’s report that the former minister decided to cooperate, to talk, because investigators recently conducted searches and seized documents on the case from his relatives.  The commentator believes his more constructive position improves his chances of escaping the affair without criminal charges.

If the existing affair of the three dachas weren’t enough, Nezavisimaya gazeta unearthed another issue last week.

In the deal to import light armored vehicles from the Italian firm IVECO, Serdyukov’s Defense Ministry allegedly conspired to avoid paying customs duties amounting to $10 million.  All for vehicles of questionable suitability for Russian conditions.  NG concludes charges will be brought against the Oboronservis officials involved in the purchase.   

The paper wonders out loud if Serdyukov will play a part in the regime’s anti-corruption campaign (such as it is): 

“A critical mass of dissatisfaction is accumulating.  The country’s leadership is turning into a hostage of its own effort to reprove part of the confused elite in this way.  Citizens have learned too much about the life of high officialdom so it’s possible the ‘valve could turn’ at any moment.  It’s possible for this besides the usual cosmetic means of a party-political character a serious sacrificial victim is required – if the process of disclosures goes far enough.  It’s possible that now some backstage casting for the role of such a victim is going on.”

Izvestiya provided details on Serdyukov’s personal involvement in building Puzikov’s resort on Zhitnoye, where he claimed officers could stay (but not for free) after air defense exercises at Ashuluk.  The former Defense Minister traveled to the site 17 times between 2010 and 2012, while the road construction and landscaping was in progress, on Air Forces helicopters leased to Chkalov Avia.  That company’s majority owner is Anna Tretyakova, and her mother Yelena is general director of Zhitnoye.

Former General Staff Chief Makarov reportedly told investigators he ordered railroad troops (v/ch 42677) to build the 6.7-kilometer road and three bridges on Serdyukov’s personal order.  The construction materials came from that unit. 

 

A law enforcement source told the paper Puzikov and Serdyukov didn’t miss a trick: 

 

“First they built themselves a dacha at government expense, and then they wanted to rent out the very same — also at government expense.”

Moskovskiy komsomolets concludes Serdyukov’s assertion that Zhitnoye would serve the needs of servicemen would be funny if it weren’t so sad.  Then:

“So, as ‘MK’ has already written, Serdyukov must sit.  Otherwise Vladimir Putin can’t prove to 140 million Russian citizens that he is as before master of the situation.”

On balance, it seems prosecutors are closing on Serdyukov.  As written here in November, there’s too much blood in the water.  Putin will sacrifice him.  His effort to rebalance the political system he created depends on more than not letting the siloviki have Serdyukov.

And what of Serdyukov-instituted reforms which promised to change still largely Soviet Armed Forces into a more modern military?  The pain of reforms joined with the taint of high-level corruption to undermine them.  Their opponents could not possibly devise a more ingenious strategy to discredit them.  That too would be funny if it weren’t so sad.

It’s All Relative (Part II)

Regret the delay in returning to the rest of this summary of the Oboronservis scandal from Newsru.com.

“The ‘Oboronservis’ Affair:  Figures and Episodes”

“Despite, more precisely, thanks to his unconstructive, in the SKR’s opinion, silence, Serdyukov continues to keep his witness status in the ‘Oboronservis’ affair.  At present the number of accused has reached eight.  And the charge of particularly large-scale fraud has been leveled at the former head of OAO ‘Oboronservis’ Vasilyeva (the restraint measure is house arrest), Smetanova (personal recognizance) and Zakutaylo (arrest).  Smetanova is also implicated in commercial bribery as a result of investigation of activity which the ‘Oboronservis’ affair initiated.”

“Another branch of the anticorruption investigation concerns OAO ‘Slavyanka’ and ZAO ‘Security and Communications.’  The three affairs, united into one case, arose over falsely signed statements of completed construction and cleaning work on Kolymazhnyy Lane, the Military Academy of the General Staff and a number of other facilities.  As of today in this affair the charge of particularly large-scale fraud has been leveled at five:  former general director of ‘Slavyanka’ and ‘Security’ founder Aleksandr Yelkin; Andrey Luganskiy, who has been general director of ‘Security’ since April 2011; ‘Security’ head bookkeeper Yuliya Rotanova.  And also Nikolay Ryabykh and Konstantin Lapshin – former acting chief of the Defense Ministry’s administrative directorate and chief of ‘Slavyanka’s’ repair department.  All of them are under arrest.”

“The largest part of criminal cases in ‘Oboronservis’ concerns the disposition of several pieces of property.  They are the complex of buildings ‘31st State Planning Institute of Special Construction’ and the ‘Main Directorate of Troop Installations,’ the hotel ‘Soyuz’ and the premises of OAO ‘Mosvoyentorg’ on the Arbat, buildings in the working-class village Bolshiye Vyazemy in Moscow Oblast, land plots in St. Petersburg.  Part of the matters arose over the facts of theft of money upon the conclusion of contracts with ‘Expert’ Smetanova, for example, in the sale of shares in Moscow-based ‘Central Experimental Production Combine’ and stakes in ООО ‘436th Non-Metallic Minerals Combine’ in Leningrad Oblast.”

“‘Thanks to timely intervention we succeeded in preventing the illegal, in our view, disposition of the building of the directorate of trade of the Moscow Military District on Bolshaya Serpukhovskaya Street in Moscow, and also the oil transshipping complex in the village of Roslyakovo-1 in Murmansk Oblast,’ - GVSU Chief Sorochkin boasted to ‘Rossiyskaya gazeta.’  He also recalled that today the general amount of losses, suffered by the state in the ‘Oboronservis’ affair, exceeded four billion rubles.”

“Serdyukov’s Brother-in-Law Could be Called for Questioning”

“So, investigators tactfully sidestep the question of whether the appearance of new figures and still more accused in the ‘Oboronservis’ affair is expected.  There are already a number of candidates to populate the list.  For example, there’s Marina Lopatina, ex-chief of OAO ‘Voyentorg’ and the ‘Red Star’ subholding.  But also head of ‘Oboronstroy’ Larisa Yegorina.  Both ladies are thought to be former classmates of Vasilyeva and at present are alleged to be on the run.”

“There are suspicions that Serdyukov’s brother-in-law is also on the run, still, it’s true, investigators are not confirming this information.  ‘I don’t have unambiguous information about this.  I confirm that we have questions for him, therefore he could be interrogated,’ – Sorochkin said.”

“Petersburg’s ‘Fontanka’ relays interesting facts from Puzikov’s life.  ‘No stranger to the family furniture business, Puzikov managed to achieve notable commercial successes also in the automobile business and in construction, and the amount of property he’s acquired is striking,’ – the article’s author notes.”

“According to the publication’s information, the Kuban native Puzikov built an expensive development where his neighbor found a space for Serdyukov’s OAO ‘Furniture-Market’ (the former ‘Lenmebeltorg’).  At the same address nine companies, fully or partly controlled by Puzikov, appeared, for example, OOO ‘Avtotsentr Soyuz 021.’  The auto business generally attracted Puzikov’s attention, ‘Fontanka’ notes.  So, he owns 15% of OOO ‘Aksel Group’ - a large dealer of BMW, Volkswagen and Toyota automobiles, one of the showrooms of which is located in the very same expensive development.  Incidentally, also located there is OOO ‘Avtoservis-MM,’ where Viktor Zubkov, father of Serdyukov’s wife Yuliya Zubkova bought a Toyota Land Cruiser, ‘Fontanka’ writes.”

“The publication also reports that Puzikov together with Aleksandr and Petr Usov and Artur Pozov was involved in construction, and also bought up property in Leningrad Oblast.  According to YEGRYUL [Unified State Register of Juridical Persons] data, today limited liability companies ‘Alyans’ (until 2012 – ‘Furniture-Market’), ‘Petersburg Agricultural Corporation,’ ‘Contemporary Food Technologies,’ ‘Investproyekt,’ ‘KRIOS’ fully belong to Puzikov, he has shares in OOO ‘Novyy Megapolis,’ ‘TrestStroyKomplekt’ and ‘InterVal.’  An OOO with the classic name ‘Vektor-SPb,’ in which Puzikov was the only participant, no longer belongs to him, but the firm remained in the larger family [?!] of the ex-defense minister — now its owner is Yevgeniya Vasilyeva, ‘Fontanka’ concludes.”

It’s All Relative (Part I)

Serdyukov in More Ebullient Times (photo: Russianlook.com)

The SK tried again Tuesday to question former Defense Minister Serdyukov about the disposition of military property near the resort town of Anapa.  But, as Interfaks reported, Mr. Serdyukov once more invoked his 51st article right against incriminating himself or close relatives.  And RF Prosecutor General Yuriy Chayka told the Duma the entire Defense Ministry corruption affair now adds up to 25 criminal cases and more than 5 billion rubles in losses to the state.

Newsru.com nicely wraps the state of play in the Defense Ministry scandal.  It’s entitled “Relatives Saving Serdyukov:  Investigators Address the Affair’s Outlook, Journalists — His Family Business Ties.”

“The inquest has brought preliminary investigative results in the ‘Oboronservis’ corruption affair, whose episodes and figures have grown so strongly for several months it’s no wonder people are confused.  The results are as yet inauspicious — the figures are silent, shielding themselves with the Constitution, or they are fleeing the country.  But, investigators note, it’s premature to say the affair will begin to subside and the former defense minister will remain in his previous status [witness].  And journalists meanwhile are trying to unscramble the great tangle of family ties enmeshing the corruption affair.”

“‘Serdyukov is going through this affair as a (‘landscaping’) witness.  To make any supposition concerning his procedural status in the future is incorrect, at a minimum.  I can assure readers of only one thing — professionals who will sort out this affair perfectly and will precisely name everyone who is guilty in what has happened work in the SKR’s Main Military Investigative Directorate [GVSU],’ director of the SKR’s Main Military Investigative Directorate Aleksandr Sorochkin told ‘Rossiyskaya gazeta’.”

“The business about improving recreation facility ‘Zhitnoye’ which belongs to Anatoliy Serdyukov’s brother-in-law Valeriy Puzikov, as is known, is not the only one on which the inquest has concrete questions for the ex-minister. But they still haven’t managed to get his statements on this episode or on others.  As is known, on 19 February Serdyukov, together with his girlfriend and ex-chief of the Defense Ministry’s property department Yevgeniya Vasilyeva, was called for questioning on episodes involving land near Anapa and the activity of the St. Petersburg engineering-technical center, which the already earlier mentioned Puzikov directed.  But both refused to talk, citing the 51st article of the Constitution on the right not to bear witness against oneself and relatives.”

“If all three figures weren’t relatives [sic?], then investigators could make them criminally responsible according to art. 308 UK RF (‘Refusal of witness or victim to give statements’), levy a fine and even arrest them for a term up to three months, ‘Kommersant’ notes.  In this way, family ties have saved the ex-minister from potentially dangerous outcomes.”

“In a conversation with ‘RG’ the main military investigator presented the results by the number of episodes and figures well-known at present in the ‘Oboronservis’ affair.  As concerns Serdyukov, for him, the witness, there are immediate questions on the three ‘dacha’ episodes.”

“Serdyukov’s Three ‘Dachas’”

“The first is the ‘Zhitnoye’ recreation facility in Mouth of the Volga, owned by his brother-in-law, but managed by the mother of the CEO of OOO ’Chkalov Avia’ Yelena Tretyakova, whom they earlier suspected of transporting facility guests and soldiers involved in its landscaping (‘ the aviation episode’) at Defense Ministry expense.”

“The second ‘recreational episode’ concerns a plot in Temryuk Rayon of Krasnodar Kray, where, it’s alleged, an elite vacation home was built on land illegally transferred from the Defense Ministry.  They’ve dubbed the facility with its grand buildings, pool, park, quay and helicopter pad served by locals ‘Serdyukov’s dacha’.  Considered instrumental in the acquisition of this former military land is the ex-chief of Moscow Air Forces District depot Maksim Zakutaylo – common law husband of Yekaterina Smetanova, ex-director of OOO ’Expert’ Legal Support Center’ and accused in a number of other episodes.”

“And finally, there are questions for Serdyukov about the allegedly illegal disposition of military land in the village of Bolshoy Utrish near Anapa.  In 2009 the Defense Ministry wrung this territory out of itself for the construction of a radar station for Black Sea Fleet ships rebasing from Sevastopol, however built it up with cottages, ‘Kommersant’ writes.  According to some information, the personal signature of Serdyukov is on documents about the land’s transfer.  And the very same brother-in-law Puzikov worked on developing the property.”

Still A Witness

Serdyukov on His Way to the SKR (photo: Kommersant / Dmitriy Dukhanin)

For now.

On Friday, the Investigative Committee of Russia (SKR) subjected Anatoliy Serdyukov to a couple hours of questioning about the Oboronservis corruption scandal.  This session was scheduled when the former defense minister refused to answer questions on December 28 because his attorney was ill and not present.

Nothing much changed this time. 

Media accounts claim Serdyukov again effectively refused to answer SKR questions, taking the Russian version of the 5th (the 51st Article of the RF Constitution against self-incrimination).  He presented some written material to investigators describing the process of selling excess Defense Ministry property during his tenure.  But, according to Vedomosti, Serdyukov denied any wrongdoing, and placed blame for the sale of significantly undervalued and underpriced military real estate squarely and completely on his former subordinates (currently under indictment).

SKR patience with Serdyukov is wearing thin.  In fact, spokesman Vladimir Markin basically warned that he could become a suspect:

“In this situation, the former defense minister’s position might be regarded as an attempt to obstruct the investigation.  If the former defense minister believes he did not participate in those events which have become the subject of the investigation, then it would be fully logical to answer specific questions of interest to investigators.  But Mr. Serdyukov and his attorney believe it simpler to lay out a free form version of events in a light favorable to himself, and not to answer uncomfortable questions of substance for the investigators.  But in the investigation there is a large number of questions for Serdyukov about how decisions on the sale of Defense Ministry property were made, why deals were made at certain prices.”

“The position Mr. Serdyukov has taken does not guarantee that he will remain just a witness in the case.  It is fully probable his status could change.”

Kommersant and Interfax.ru reported Serdyukov claimed he signed off on paperwork for Defense Ministry property deals without looking into their “commercial aspects.”

A Kommersant source in the SKR admitted problems connecting Serdyukov to property sales or kickbacks.  However, he said investigators are looking at why Defense Ministry personnel and equipment built an 8-kilometer, 20-million-ruble road for a VIP resort in Astrakhan Oblast partly owned by the ex-defense minister’s brother-in-law, Valeriy Puzikov.  They’re also looking into high-priced Black Sea vacation homes built by Puzikov on Defense Ministry land.  

The SKR is apparently warming up charges against Serdyukov for exceeding and misusing his official authority. 

Investigators are clearly turning up the heat on Anatoliy Eduardovich.

Okryg.ru wrapped it succinctly:

“Serdyukov has a lot to be silent about.  Because if they’ve already decided to put him in jail, then helping the investigation is unrewarding.  Besides, it seems, the ex-minister still has a glimmer of hope that they will protect him.  Or, if you like, fight them off.”

“Judging by the reaction of official SK representative Vladimir Markin to the result of the second questioning, the Investigative Committee’s intention to put Serdyukov behind bars is practically unyielding.”

The blog calls Serdyukov a Putin creature who became ”untouchable” but then got out of Putin’s control.  It concludes:

“The status of Anatoliy Serdyukov (witness or accused) depends not on what he said or was silent about, and not on how the investigator evaluated his answers or silence.  The fate of an official at such a level, at which Anatoliy Serdyukov dwelled, is decided exclusively in the Kremlin, that is, at the highest level.”

So will Putin see any reason to save Serdyukov, or will Putin leave him to the wolves?  Or can Putin control the wolves at this point?

Stories of the Year

RIA Novosti has its list of the main military events of 2012.

No surprise number 1 is the Oboronservis scandal, the fall of former Defense Minister Serdyukov, and appointment of successor Sergey Shoygu.

The rest:

• 16 accidents in munition destruction leaving 12 dead and 23 injured.
• Retirement of the CO of the Strizhi flight demonstration group who allegedly demanded money from subordinates for the freedom to show up for duty or not.  Remember Senior Lieutenant Sulim at Lipetsk?
• Vityazi flight group doesn’t participate in Farnborough.
• Ex-Gorshkov carrier still not delivered to India due to power plant problems.
• Rearmament of RVSN with Yars and Topol-M ICBMs.  See Karakayev’s remarks the other day.
• Acceptance of Dolgorukiy, Nevskiy, Bulava, and Severodvinsk all put off until 2013.
• Delayed space vehicle launches, but fewer failures than in 2011.
• The death of Ruslan Ayderkhanov.  A surprise pick.  Remember the army and medical examiners say he killed himself even though he was beaten and abused before he died.
• The contract for five Borey SSBNs, and Prime Minister / President Putin’s role in getting the Defense Ministry and industry to agree on a price.
• The collapse of Moscow’s $4.2 billion arms deal with Iraq amid talk of corruption.
• Losing another Indian helicopter tender to the U.S.
• Russia’s conference on EuroMD.

Gerasimov Says No Sharp Course Change

General-Colonel Gerasimov (photo: RIA Novosti / Sergey Pyatikov)

Gazeta.ru pieced together RIA Novosti clips of General Staff Chief Valeriy Gerasimov’s session with foreign military attaches yesterday.

Gerasimov said army reforms begun by former Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov will be “corrected,” not radically altered:

“Anticipating your questions on the possibility of a sharp course change in military organizational development, I would note there won’t be one.  In 2008, the Russian Federation President clearly indicated development tasks for our army, they will be fulfilled.  Naturally, some issues are being subjected to certain correction accounting for deficiencies revealed.”

“Organizational development” is primarily (but not entirely) TO&E and force structure.

Gazeta reports Gerasimov said mixed conscript and contract manning will be preserved, and the one-year conscript service term won’t be increased as some would like.

The new NGSh said the Defense Ministry is creating its own element to track fulfillment of the state defense order (GOZ):

“And by the minister’s decision, a structure will be created in the Defense Ministry which allows for controlling not only the completion of contracts, but work in all phases of the production cycle.”

Serdyukov’s Defense Ministry had various organs with this responsibility, including Rosoboronzakaz, Rosoboronpostavka, etc.  How will the new structure be better?

Gazeta closes with expert opinions on the fate of reforms introduced by Serdyukov.  Igor Korotchenko says:

“We didn’t have Anatoliy Serdyukov’s reform, but a reform the main parameters of which were set by the president.  That is the military reform course will continue fully with the exception of some cases of deficiencies revealed in the military education system, military medicine, and the reinforcement of control procedures over the activity of those structures involved in armed forces outsourcing.”

Ever-skeptical Aleksandr Khramchikhin doesn’t think there was a coherent course to be changed:

“In the army reform, there wasn’t a clear plan of action, one won’t appear under the new defense minister.”

“I don’t think Shoygu’s Defense Ministry will try to correct the course of reform or introduce some fixes.  There is nothing to correct.  Serdyukov’s reform had no kind of course, it went by the trial and error method.  There are grounds to believe that Shoygu will act according to the same principle.”

There’s a long list of policies commentators think will or might be changed, but little so far officially.  A new category to replace Serdyukov’s Reforms is needed.  Maybe Shoygu’s Nuanced Corrections?

Can He Possibly Avoid Prosecution?

Anatoliy Serdyukov (photo: ITAR-TASS / Aleksandr Mudrats)

Probably not.

It seems likely President Vladimir Putin, at some point, will turn Anatoliy Serdyukov over to the law, such as it is in Russia.  Despite assertions to the contrary, Putin will bow to evidence his former defense minister knew about,  condoned, or even participated in corruption schemes.

What’s Putin’s calculus?

Putin stands to look like a corruption fighter, perhaps for the first time.  Most of that corruption occurred on his protege-predecessor’s watch.  Serdyukov’s lost his tie to Putin’s closest associates through his estranged father-in-law Viktor Zubkov, so it’s free fire.  Putin can even save money by not pouring all 19 trillion rubles into new arms procurement by 2020 while investigators and prosecutors take at least 2-3 years unraveling the mess.

Few will recall Putin appointed Serdyukov to straighten out the Defense Ministry’s financial flows.  That didn’t work out too well.  Not many will remember Serdyukov was brought in because of the meager results of Putin’s stewardship of defense between 2000 and 2007.  Essentially, 12 years of Putin’s control and direction of the armed forces (de jure, de facto, or both) have come to little.  None of this will loom large politically for Putin.

On balance, it’s an easy decision to turn Anatoliy Eduardovich over to his fate.

Compared with nine months ago, clouds completely surround Serdyukov now.

Izvestiya wrote about his sister’s wealth right after the scandal broke.  A FGUP her husband ran won a lucrative one-bidder Defense Ministry vehicle leasing contract in 2010.  It’s not clear he was in charge of the firm when it got the deal.  But there can’t be any doubt the family connection was the reason for getting it.  The story appeared here, but the role of Serdyukov’s brother-in-law was unknown at the time.

This week the media reported Oboronservis affiliates responsible for paying energy suppliers for heating military installations are suddenly 4 billion rubles in the red.

The Investigative Committee (SK) searched Serdyukov’s cottage, along with those of other defense officials.

One-time Serdyukov deputy, apparent girlfriend, and central scandal figure, Yevgeniya Vasilyeva was denied bail and is under home detention.

Law enforcement sources are talking anonymously about much higher-profile and wider investigations.  There’s nibbling at other edges.  The SK is looking into alleged GOZ misappropriations.  The Main Military Prosecutor is reviewing old accusations about the poor design and quality of the army’s new uniforms.

Can Serdyukov avoid prosecutorial sharks with this much blood in the water?  Probably not.  Is he responsible for all Defense Ministry corruption?  Yes, by virtue of his former position. 

Could he become a sympathetic figure if he goes to prison?  Maybe.  Serdyukov might be seen as someone unwilling or unable to fix a broken system.  Perhaps guilty, but no more than Putin . . . a scapegoat or symbol of Russian problems larger than one man or one department of government.

The New Face of Russian Defense Policy

Sergey Kuzhugetovich Shoygu

Quite a surprise, a shock.  An interesting choice.  An ethnic Tuvan, an engineer who spent his post-Soviet life heading MChS — the Ministry of Emergency Situations, who was Governor of Moscow Oblast for just six months.

It’s a hard to imagine Shoygu advancing change and reform in the military to the degree Serdyukov did.

Despite his successes, Anatoliy Eduardovich was done in by offending his estranged mentor, father-in-law, and close Putin confidant, Viktor Zubkov.  The straw that broke the camel’s back was when police found the Defense Minister at Vasilyeva’s apartment, just below his own (how convenient), at 0600.

Ironically, Serdyukov wasn’t done in by the corruption of his young, largely female team of civilian administrators and former tax service officials.  And perhaps he wasn’t done in by his own corruption.  We’ll have to see what fate awaits him.

Serdyukov came close but didn’t match Sergey Ivanov.  Serdyukov spent 2,091 days as defense minister to the latter’s 2,150.

Can’t help but feel Shoygu won’t come close to either number.

Not a Fish, But a Crawdad (Part II)

Topwar’s summation of the Kommersant story on Defense Minister Serdyukov’s retention brought many comments in its forum.  They came mainly from conservative critics of Serdyukov and President Putin.

It’s a tough slog for anyone suggesting Serdyukov has done things that were overdue and necessary.  Anatoliy Eduardovich is roundly criticized for destroying what existed, and not putting anything better in its place.  Worse, some call him a traitor serving “Western interests.”

S_mirnov writes only a real idiot, or one who values an apartment more than his country, could believe Serdyukov is the best man to guarantee officers housing.  To him, the reappointment of Serdyukov is akin to giving the Titanic’s captain a new ship and having him sail to the same destination with surviving passengers.

Sinandju concludes not sending Serdyukov into retirement is just another sign of what Putin’s oligarchic-bureaucratic government is all about.

Redpartyzan alleges there were more questions about Serdyukov’s performance in office than ministers who were not reappointed.

BigLexey says Serdyukov’s been kept around to be a scapegoat for the army’s problems at an appropriate time, so the president and prime minister won’t be blamed.

Kadet787 from Belarus shares a poem about Russia appointing as Defense Minister not a wolf or bear, but an ass who sells military property for half what its worth.

To Topwar’s suggestion that time might tell about Serdyukov’s continuing tenure, Older replies all of Taburetkin’s wonders have been seen and Putin and Medvedev have behaved strangely.

Then Teves from Germany asserts Serdyukov remains because he did what Putin wanted despite the illusions of “superpatriots.”

Borisst64 analyzes the situation like this:

“The aim of Serdyukov’s appointment was clear from the start – destroying the structure of the country’s VS [Armed Forces], if they leave him, it means severe decisions (cuts, relocations, etc.) will still be implemented. The logic is understandable, the people’s attitude toward Serdyukov is negative, still they are patient, and we’ll appoint a new one [Defense Minister] when everything is perfect and nothing threatens the [new Armed Forces] image.”

Olegych picks up the defense of the Defense Minister:

“Serdyukov is a normal, honest Defense Minister, cleaning up all the bullsh** accumulated for decades.  Dedovshchina, thievery, ruined bases and military units, the lack of arms and POL supplies, the absence of housing – that’s what was, and what would be left.  And if you poured trillions of rubles into the sad MO [Defense Ministry] structure that existed before him, the result would be poor.  In the context given, Serdyukov is not a fighter, but a finance officer, a controller of resources, of tightly planned and justified expenditures.  And here’s the entire answer to why he remains at his post.  He remains at his post because there are real and tangible results from his leadership:  housing acquired, new armaments introduced, increased pay, an increase in exercises and flights, the destruction of millions of tons of old and dangerous ammunition, untangling the flywheel of the Gosoboronzakaz.  Cutting the number of servicemen and training institutions is an essential and necessary step, because there are no resources to maintain them.”

For a bit, the discussion devolves to Putin, whether “the Tsar is good and the boyars bad,” and whether it’s OK to insult the president.  And, more interestingly, whether Putin will eventually lose support and give rise to more “bolotniki.”

There’s a final counter to Olegych when Drugar says:

“Why Serdyukov is again Defense Minister is obvious.  The only thing not understood is what servicemen and the army / fleet as a whole are waiting for.  Generally, judging by recent events, the army is turning into a commercial enterprise, this transformation of everything and all to a civilian basis has allowed turning the servicing of army structures into a fantastically profitable and absolutely unpunishable business!  It’s possible to steal billions, imagine how much it costs to feed, clothe soldiers, repair equipment, supply spare parts, build-repair, and the like.  But, if someone will say it, report, Mr. Serdyukov – a MILITARY SECRET, gentlemen, a military secret . . .  This is the finale, the culmination of the Putinist corruption scheme!  So in Russia they still never steal . . .  People have become mute and blind from propaganda and zombification, have lost the ability to think (!), they are accustomed to softened up facts from the state’s zombie box [television].  Pronouncing ‘that yes they’re all d*cks there in the end,’ every one will stay home and continue hoping Putin will steal, steal, but remember about the people . . .  In vain.”

No absolute answer why Serdyukov remains, but some interesting and reasonably educated opinions.

Not a Fish, But a Crawdad (Part I)

It’s nice when you send yourself on a sabbatical.  But it’s terrible when your first post of the month doesn’t come until the 24th.  Seriously, this author should be flogged for neglecting the reader.  And he isn’t exactly prepared to dive back into frenetic posting either.  Only to hang more text out here now and again.

Serdyukov with Putin (photo: AFP)

This topic and title were stolen from Topwar.ru.  The site picked up on Kommersant’s examination of why Anatoliy Serdyukov was one of only five ministers to retain his post in the first Putin 2.0 government.

Kommersant claims Serdyukov came somewhat close to being retired in December when, at then-Prime Minister Putin’s behest, FSB Director Bortnikov searched out potential replacements.  Bortnikov looked at Rostekh’s Chemezov, Roskosmos’ Popovkin, and Deputy PM and OPK steward Rogozin.  The former pair convinced Putin of the “inexpedience” of making either of them Defense Minister in Serdyukov’s place.  Rogozin reportedly was willing, but, of course, already had a higher-ranking post.

Kommersant’s Ivan Safronov cited Aleksandr Kanshin and a Defense Ministry apparat source to the effect that Putin decided it’d be better to have Serdyukov see the military reform process through to its conclusion.

For its part, Topwar.ru also attributes Serdyukov’s ”unsinkability” to a desire to avoid changing leadership in the midst of reform.  It also writes that Anatoliy Eduardovich turned out to be, at least in some ways, the best available and most willing candidate.  Topwar sums Serdyukov’s position up with this adage:

“When there aren’t any fish, even a crawdad is a fish.”

But Anatoliy Rak isn’t likely to replace Taburetkin as a nickname for the Defense Minister.

The most interesting part of Topwar’s account, however, may be the large number of commentaries, which we’ll look at in part II of this post.