Tag Archives: State Armaments Program

More Money in GPV-2020

ITAR-TASS yesterday cited a Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) source who said the volume of financing for the State Armaments Program 2011-2020 (GPV-2020) will be 13 trillion rubles (roughly $430 billion).  The source said this amount includes purchases of new arms and equipment, development of new types, soldier gear, and other army necessities.  He said the Finance and Economic Development Ministries are familiar with the amount and have not objected.

As background, ITAR-TASS reminded that this money is supposed to get Russia to not less than 30 percent modern armaments by 2015, and not less than 70 percent by 2020, according to Prime Minister Putin’s goals.

Deputy Defense Minister, Armaments Chief Vladimir Popovkin has said the RF Security Council will review GPV-2020 in June, and it will be the basis for developing a new Federal Targeted Program for OPK development.

So, 13 trillion rubles over the 10-year period is 1.3 trillion rubles in procurement per annum (undeflated, of course).  At face value, this is a significant increase over the old GPV 2007-2015, which was reportedly funded at 5 trillion rubles for 9 years, or about 550 billion rubles in military purchasing per annum.

But it’s not so easy.  First, the cascading and overlapping way the GPVs are done (how did the last years of the old one mesh with the first years of the new one?) would make it well-nigh impossible to judge what was actually bought, even if it were clear how much money was disbursed when and what was bought with it.  But none of those things are clear to outside observers, and probably not clear even to officers and officials inside the system.

Rearmament Tempo Less Than 2 Percent Per Year

Vasiliy Burenok

Vasiliy Burenok told a round table at the ‘Army and Society’ exhibition in Moscow Friday that the current pace of Russian force modernization, not more than 2 percent, won’t support the transition to a ‘new profile’ military.

Burenok is Director of the Defense Ministry’s 46th Scientific-Research Institute (46 NII).  The 46 NII is a lead organization involved in formulating the State Armaments Program (GPV) and State Defense Order (GOZ).  It works on military-technical policy documents and program planning methodologies.  Burenok is a member of the Scientific-Technical Council of the RF Government’s Military-Industrial Commission (VPK).

Reviewing history a bit, Burenok told his audience, at the beginning of the 1990s, the rearmament rate was 5-7 percent annually.  But, between 1991 and 2000, financing for new arms and equipment declined more than 50 times, leaving only enough money to maintain existing weapons.

Burenok concludes to get the army to the ‘new profile’ it’s essential to introduce 9 percent new equipment every year, and for some services and combat arms, up to 11 percent.

This 9 to 11 percent is, of course, the difficult target President Medvedev set at the Defense Ministry Collegium.  Burenok indicated just how difficult–going from less than 2 to an 11 percent annual renewal rate.

Armaments Chief and Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin also addressed the ‘Army and Society’ round table.  He said GPV 2011-2020 will go to the president for approval in June.  The new GPV will be accompanied by yet another new Federal Targeted Program for OPK Development.

Popovkin said a number of systems won’t be produced under the new GPV.  They include short-range tube artillery, and BTR-80, BMP-2, and BMP-3 combat vehicles that soldiers are afraid to ride in.

Limited Productive Capacity, High Demand for Arms and Equipment

Surprisingly little attention, beyond routine press service reports, went to last Tuesday’s (16 February) government conference on the State Armaments Program, 2011-2020 (GPV-2020).  RIAN and older media reporting indicates the GPV-2020 will be adopted next month.

Prime Minister Putin told the attendees, “We are talking about the time frames and kinds of weapons systems we need to provide to our army and fleet, that have to be put into the arms inventory.”  Noting that nuclear deterrence forces, space, and air defense would be emphasized, Putin also said:

“We have to satisfy, as I already said, the troops’ need for modern communications, command and control, reconnaissance and, of course, complete the fifth generation aircraft, new combatant designs for the Navy.”

He reiterated earlier declarations that modern armaments in the forces must be 30 percent by 2015, and 70 percent by 2020.

Other Putin sound bytes:

“We have to provide essential financial resources for this task.  The Finance Ministry, the Economic Development Ministry have made the necessary calculations, and today we’ll need to analyze them.  Right off I want to note that we can’t allow any inflated estimates, ineffective expenditures.”

“The State Armaments Program has to give long-term guidance for developing the defense-industrial complex itself.  This must enable our enterprises to embark on a corresponding modernization.”

“We’ve conducted a whole series of meetings on these issues, but the Defense Ministry must provide the corresponding technical parameters.  We have to support the technological equipping of our defense-industrial complex exactly under these parameters.”

Finally, Putin indicated defense orders will go to enterprises that will be in a condition to produce truly competitive systems in terms of combat power, range, and protection.

Participants in the conference also reportedly discussed a new draft Federal Targeted Program (FTP or ФЦП) on the Development of the OPK.

On 15 February, Putin met with Industry Minister Khristenko and Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTС or ФСВТС) Mikhail Dmitriyev.  Khristenko told Putin last year OPK enterprises received 148 billion rubles in state support (6 billion in credits, 60 billion in capital injections, 76 billion in state-guaranteed credits, and 6 billion in subsidized interest rates on export credits).  According to Khristenko, this support allowed the OPK to increase its production 10 percent.

Unnamed Defense Ministry sources said the 76 billion rubles in state-guaranteed credits are difficult to use, and not all were used.  The 60 billion rubles in capital injections were basically a direct budgetary grant, and, according to one aviation plant manager, 20 billion of it went (get this!) to compensate RSK MiG and other producers for the fiasco with their 34 faulty MiG-29s sold to, and returned by, Algeria.

FSMTC Director Dmitriyev told Putin the volume of Russia’s current arms export contracts is $34 billion, and exports will be $9-10 billion over the next two years.

Aleksey Nikolskiy writing for Vedomosti indicated Dmitriyev said several enterprises have orders for some systems scheduled out to 2017, and some foreign customers have raised the issue of quicker deliveries.  He argued that additional production capacity is needed, but Putin proposed only to review the issue of synchronizing domestic and export orders for arms.  He said, “We have to understand in what time frame we can and have to produce for ourselves and our foreign partners.”

A source close to Rosoboroneksport said the issue concerned limitations in production capacity for the S-300PMU2 and S-400 air defense systems, the Su-35 fighter, and surface-to-surface missiles that don’t allow for simultaneously meeting the demands of foreign customers and the Russian Armed Forces.  Vedomosti noted that VVS CINC Zelin already complained about limited productive capacity for the S-400.  A similar jam exists with the Su-35, which is supposed to enter the VVS and some foreign air forces by the end of 2011.  A Defense Ministry source said there’s a proposal to build two new factories for air defense systems, and to enlarge existing enterprises producing critical equipment, and the government might soon adopt the proposal.

Konstantin Makiyenko of CAST (ЦАСТ) told Vedomosti, for the past 2 years, Rosoboroneksport has received more orders than what it has supplied abroad, and the lack of sufficient productive capacity has become the main limiting factor on the growth of arms exports.  He says either increase the capacity or the army will have to wait for arms it doesn’t need too much, but air defense systems and fighters don’t fall into the category of things not urgently needed.

As Mikhail Rastopshin and others have been so kind to note, there have been a raft of OPK development and armaments programs over the years, but they don’t seem to get completed, each melding into the next albeit under a longer deadline.   In early 2009, Dmitriy Litovkin estimated no more than 20 percent of any arms program has ever been accomplished, even during the years of high oil revenues.

And you can’t do an armaments program without OPK development, and Russia’s defense-industrial base has been increasingly poorly positioned to support the arms program in recent years, according to Rastopshin and others.  And don’t forget about declining RDT&E.  Hard times for research institutes and design bureaus could mean that, rather than modern or futuristic weapons based on ‘new physical principles,’ new units of obsolete designs could be produced under an armaments program.

Here’s a telling reminder.  The  much-vaunted 2003 Urgent Tasks of the Development of the Russian Armed Forces document called for modern weapons at the level of 35 percent in 2010, 40-45 percent in 2015, and 100 percent by 2020-2025.  And now Moscow’s talking 30 percent by 2015 and only 70 percent by 2020.

As recently as 2006, the Russian military claimed 20 percent of its weapons inventory was modern.  But in March 2009, Defense Minister Serdyukov admitted the starting point was actually lower:

“. . . the bulk of [arms and equipment] are physically and morally obsolete. Natural loss is not being compensated by procurement.  As a result, the proportion of modern arms and military equipment is around 10 percent.”

This was when President Medvedev said large-scale rearmament would begin in 2011.

Nevertheless, in his November 2009 address to the Federal Assembly, Medvedev said:

“One of the most difficult yet fundamental tasks is reequipping the troops with new systems and models of armaments and military hardware.  There is no need to discuss some abstract notions here: one needs to obtain these weapons.  Next year, more than 30 land and sea-based ballistic missiles, five Iskander missile systems, about 300 modern armored vehicles, 30 helicopters, 28 warplanes, three nuclear submarines, and one corvette-class combatant must be delivered to the troops, as well as 11 spacecraft.  All this has to be done.”

A pretty daunting list when foreign customers are asking for their weapons too.

When Will the Air Forces Get More S-400s?

First S-400 Battalion on Duty in 2007 (photo: Leonid Yakutin)

On 9 February, RIA Novosti quoted Air Forces CINC Aleksandr Zelin:

“All that has been planned and must be supplied in the coming years, has been agreed with Almaz-Antey, will be fulfilled on time.  The S-400 antiaircraft missile system is fully entering the Air Forces’ weapons inventory.  The shift in the schedule for its supply has some organizational but mainly a technical character.”

Reminding the press that he’s member of the Almaz-Antey board of directors, Zelin said, “At the last session, we talked over all issues connected with planned supplies of the S-400 to the Air Forces.”

It sounds like Zelin is admitting the S-400 has been delayed, and the reasons are technical in nature.  Maybe there’s been some problem in the S-400’s operations or capabilities. 

So where does the S-400 stand?  Two battalions were fielded at Elektrostal near Moscow in 2007 and 2008, and Air Forces spokesmen have said repeatedly that 5 additional battalions will be delivered this year. The State Armaments Program, 2007-2015, called for 18 battalions by 2015.  But, as Mikhail Rastopshin has said, 18 battalions don’t cover Russia’s main administrative and industrial centers or support its strategic nuclear forces. 

In the midst of his late November criticism of Russian defense industry’s inability to provide the VVS with the UAVs it needs, Zelin also said Russian needs a second factory to produce the S-400 Triumf and other future air defense systems.  According to him, Almaz-Antey cannot fully satisfy the country’s demand for S-400 systems.  Not sounding too sure, he added that, “In 2010, we need to receive another five battalions, but everything depends on the industry and financing.”

Commenting on the S-400 tests at Ashuluk, Zelin said he was satisfied with the results, but the tactical-technical characteristics in the system are “still less than we wanted.”  He may be referring to lingering, well-known problems with the S-400’s long-range missiles.

VVS CINC General-Colonel Aleksandr Zelin

Zelin went on to criticize the pace of development of the next generation S-500:

“Development of this system doesn’t satisfy me.  We would like for the existing potential in the Almaz-Antey concern to be doubled or even tripled.”

He said he planned to raise the S-500 development issue at the December board meeting.

More recently, on 28 January, Rosoboroneksport General Director Isaykin indicated that, although he has foreign orders for the S-400, Russia’s requirements would be met first.

On 17 September, Almaz General Director Ashurbeyli told ITAR-TASS that the S-500 would need 4-5 years to complete.  On possible S-400 export orders, he said he could only say two countries had signed large agreements for more than 10 battalions, but contracts remained to be finalized.  But Zelin made another statement this day that the system would go first to Russia’s armed forces.

So to recap.  The S-400 supply schedule has shifted for technical reasons.  The VVS hasn’t gotten a battalion since 2008.  Zelin admits he’s not fully happy with the S-400’s capabilities.  He says everything depends on the manufacturer, with whom he’s unhappy.  Meanwhile, foreign customers are already lined up for the S-400 that Russia can’t get and Almaz-Antey is marching off on the new S-500.

Rastopshin on OPK’s Problems

In yesterday’s Vremya novostey, Mikhail Rastopshin recalled how President Medvedev reproached the OPK last year for lagging in the production of new types of weapons to rearm Russia’s military. Medvedev said, if Moscow’s enemies possess superior weapons, no strategy or tactics will help Russia.

Rastopshin asks why the rearmament tasks laid down in documents like the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine remain unfulfilled? These documents seem like they did nothing to slow the degradation of the OPK and the army.

Among other basic state documents, Rastopshin mentions the Federal Goal Program (FTsP or ФЦП) Reform and Development of the Defense-Industrial Complex (2002-2006), but it didn’t bring the desired results. The first Russian State Armaments Program for 1996-2005 (GPV-2005) was in ruins a year after it was adopted. The second, the GPV for 2001-2010 (GPV-2010), and the current GPV for 2007-2015 (GVP-2015) are coming to naught.

According to Rastopshin, this attests to an inability to forecast arms and equipment development tens year out. There’s not only a lag of technological generations in traditional armaments, but an absence of entire classes of new weapons based on different physical principles.

After the Georgian war, Medvedev apparently ordered Serdyukov to prepared proposals on outfitting the army with modern combat support equipment. This amounted to ‘reloading’ the GVP. One can suppose that serious proposals didn’t ensue since Medvedev had to return to this problem in late 2009.

Weapons from yesterday are not infrequently put forth as our modern armaments. But there’s no other place to get them since military science and design bureaus are in a steep decline. The insolvency of the domestic defense system can be followed in the munitions sector, which hasn’t produced artillery shells since 2005. Russia lacks war reserves of ammunition, and an army without munitions is no longer an army. The sector has been producing poor quality powder, making it likely that fragmentation shells won’t reach their targets and armor-piercing ones will lose their penetration capability.

Taken as a whole, the existing armaments development system can’t provide a high tempo of rearmament, nor quality which continues to drop in both domestic and export orders. Complaints from foreign buyers are increasing, but domestic complaints are concealed. The fall in quality places doubt over future weapons. And there’s a huge divergence between the army’s demand for new weapons and the OPK’s ability to provide them, according to Rastopshin.

The quality problem won’t be resolved because OPK management is so complicated. The OPK has been reformed 8 times in the past 15 years. The lack of quality restructuring at the top exacerbated problems at the bottom. Management could not bring order to NIIs, KBs, or factories, failure above gave birth to technical breakdowns below. Rastopshin says in today’s RF Government, the Department for OPK Industries has the same status as the Communal Services Department, a situation tantamount to simply ignoring the country’s defense capability.

The creation of industrial holdings was chosen as the path to improved OPK management. Uniting in these holdings enterprises that use old production equipment, lack sufficiently qualified personnel, have eliminated quality control, testing, standardization, and military acceptance offices cannot bring the desired results.  It results only in old weapons unsuited for combat in today’s conflicts.  Rastopshin recommends returning to a Ministry of Defense Industry [sounds a little like one more reform at the top that doesn't influence the situation below].

Rastopshin sees a gulf between the army’s ‘new profile’ structure and supplying it with new arms.  For this reason, he says, the combat readiness of the new TO&E brigade with old armaments remains extremely low.

He points to NATO’s superiority in conventional arms to say that Russia couldn’t hold out two weeks.  Russia would have to resort not only to strategic, but also tactical nuclear weapons.  So Rastopshin concludes Russia needs to revisit the issue of producing nuclear-armed intermediate and shorter range missiles, and leaving the INF Treaty.  He sees Moscow as having little choice since it’s left choosing between conventional defeat or strategic nuclear conflict.

Rastopshin sums up, it’s time to stop giving the army old, ‘modernized’ weapons, the life cycle of which was long ago used up.  Medvedev himself has said this more than once.

Sadly, Rastopshin offers more criticism than solid answers (except for seeing an INF withdrawal as one path for Russia).  Science and applied science need to be improved as does personnel training for the OPK.  New requirements need to be put on the OPK.  He’d also like to see some of those who have reorganized the OPK punished for irresponsible actions that have damaged the country’s defense capability.