Returning to procurement and the GPV . . . in this week’s Delovoy vtornik, NVO’s Viktor Litovkin also asks what will 19 trillion rubles be spent on.
He says the answer isn’t simple. During the last 20 years of ‘starvation rations,’ the armed forces got handfuls of essential combat equipment, and, meanwhile, a dangerous imbalance between strike and combat support systems was created. And this was obvious against Georgia in 2008.
Litovkin says this imbalance has to be corrected, meanwhile priorities like strategic nuclear forces can’t be forgotten – not just the offensive triad, but also the missile attack early warning system (SPRN), missile defense (PRO), and aerospace defense (VKO).
Like Viktor Yesin of late, Litovkin asks how Russia will replace its aging strategic offensive arms to stay up to the limits of the Prague / New START agreement. Half the Russian force is SS-18, SS-19, and SS-25 ICBMs which will be retired in 7-10 years. Moscow needs to build 400 strategic systems to replace them. He doesn’t even mention Delta III and IV SSBNs and their aging SLBMS. And Russia has only the SS-27, RS-24 Yars, Sineva, and Bulava to replace them.
Litovkin expects a very large amount of money to be spent not just on replacing strategic systems, but also reequipping the enterprises that produce them.
He turns to his second priority – also demonstrated by the Georgian war – precision-guided weapons, which in turn depend on reconnaissance-information support and equipment in space, on long-range surveillance aircraft [AWACS], and UAVs.
Priority three – automated command and control systems (ASU). He cites Popovkin on linking all service C2 systems into one system over 2-3 years.
Litovkin says you can’t forget about the Navy, but he mentions just the Borey-class SSBNs, and the need for a wide range of surface ships. And he makes the point [made by many] that Mistral is all well and good, but it’ll have to have multipurpose combatants operating in its battle group. They need to be built, and they won’t cost a small amount of money.
One can’t forget aviation either. Litovkin cites a $100 million per copy cost for 60 fifth generation fighters [that’s a significant 180-billion-ruble bite out of the GPV]. He notes Vega is working on an updated Russian AWACS (A-100). And, like Korotchenko, he mentions transport aircraft, but also combat and support helicopters.
And so, says Litovkin, the question arises – isn’t the country putting out a lot of money to rearm its army?
Being bold, he says, not really. He actually uses that accursed 22 trillion figure, which is procurement for all power ministries. If he used 19 trillion, it would be 1.9 trillion or $63 billion per year for Russia against $636 billion for the U.S., $78 billion for China, $58 billion for the U.K., and $51 billion for Japan. But he doesn’t say this is annual procurement, the GPV, against the total annual defense budget for these other countries. A bit of comparing one piece of pie to a whole pie. Nevertheless, he concludes this makes Russia far from champion when it comes to military expenditures.
Litovkin’s last word is Russia will remain one of the G8 with a powerful, combat capable, and effective army, but without it, only a raw materials appendage of either the West or East.
But one wonders, hasn’t Russia long been in the G8 without that kind of armed forces? Doesn’t breaking away from the raw materials supplier role have more to do with developing an open, attractive, innovative, value-added, and competitive economy (and a political system and society to match) than with military power?