Tag Archives: GOZ

Impatient Putin

Once flagship of a robust Russian military press, NVO isn’t what it was.  What is after 15 years of Putin?  But NVO still has moments.  Its 22 May editorial is one.

Putin at 15 May Meeting

Putin at 15 May Meeting

NVO writes that recent Roskosmos failures overshadowed President Vladimir Putin’s mid-May meetings with Defense Ministry and defense industry leaders on the GOZ and GPV.  Still the 9 May Victory Day parade on Red Square showed much has been done to rearm Russia.  But much doesn’t mean every problem has been solved.  Rather, NVO contends, problems in the realization of GPV 2011-2020 and GPV 2016-2025 are “snowballing.”

The paper offers cases in point:

  • The fifth generation T-50 (PAK FA) fighter didn’t fly over Red Square even though it’s supposed to be in serial production already. The impatient Putin gave Russian designers just five years to field the T-50 while the Americans took 14 years from first flight to first delivery with the F-22 and 12 with the F-35.
  • Only a short time — two years — has been allowed for serial production of the new Armata tank.  The Soviet T-64 took 10-15 years from the start of testing until all development work was finished.  The call for Armata tanks and other armored vehicles on the same base in 2015 is just a “wish.”  Serial production won’t begin earlier than 2018.
  • There are delays in other key military programs — S-350 Vityaz, S-500 Triumfator-M, and missile defense systems (no specifics provided).

Then NVO reels off a list of weapons the Russian military needs that, the editorial asserts, aren’t exactly rolling off assembly lines:

  • Transport aircraft;
  • UAVs;
  • Air-launched missiles;
  • Air ordnance;
  • Artillery and fire control systems;
  • Space systems.

Regarding the final bullet, the paper notes that “even a huge investment of budget resources still won’t save Roskosmos from its systemic crisis.”

NVO concludes:

“On the whole, fulfillment of GPV-2020 and GPV-2025 has been summoned to restore Russia to military parity with NATO, if only the Russian economy can withstand the strain.  If not, the history of the USSR may be repeated.”

Some will quibble about particular systems NVO claims Moscow will have trouble fielding, but the general point remains:  far from everything needed by a military neglected for 20 years is being successfully procured.  There are more than a few independent Russian economists who say Moscow’s current high level of defense spending is damaging an economy already challenged by lower oil prices and Western sanctions.

Year of Accomplishments

Krasnaya zvezda called this story “Year of Accomplishments,” but might have called it Day of Military Acceptance . . . .

President and Supreme CINC Vladimir Putin visited the NTsUO for the first time on 18 December.  He familiarized himself with the new national command center and its capabilities for accommodating and coordinating the work of the military and other high-level government organs.

Putin Touring the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

Putin Touring the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

Putin’s seat is in the upper balcony opposite the big screens.

Another View of the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

Another View of the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

The first real order of business, however, was reviewing fulfillment of the State Defense Order in 2014.

Recall this year the political leadership and Defense Ministry launched a quarterly exercise of enumerating what was procured the previous three months on what they call the Day of Military Acceptance (День военной приёмки).

It’s almost as though the Kremlin is irritated someone has audaciously suggested that Russian output of new armaments and other military equipment hasn’t been especially impressive in years past.  

The Supreme CINC said:

“At recent meetings in Sochi we already noted that practically all Gosoboronzakaz tasks for this year have been fulfilled, and its general volume increased by almost half in comparison with 2013.”

Putin went on to say that 4,500 weapons, military, and special equipment were acquired in 2014, including:

  • 142 aircraft;
  • 135 helicopters;
  • 4 submarines;
  • 15 surface ships and boats / craft;
  • 19 SAM systems;
  • 590 tanks and BMPs;
  • 3 Yars ICBM regiments;
  • 7 modernized Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers.

It isn’t clear which four submarines the Russian president means.  Probably the third Borey-class (proyekt 955A) SSBN Vladimir Monomakh and Improved Kilo-class (proyekt 636.3) diesel-electric Novorossiysk.  But Borey unit 2 Aleksandr Nevskiy was accepted late last year.  And it would be a stretch to accept the next two Improved Kilos before January.

KZ then turns to Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu and his words before an expanded MOD collegium in the NTsUO.

He said Russian strategic forces received 38 intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2014 — 16 ICBMs and 22 SLBMs — most of the latter placed on Borey unit 1 Yuriy Dolgorukiy.  He claimed that 56 percent of Russia’s strategic weapons are now “modern.”

Shoygu said Russia’s 14 UAV sub-units (companies or platoons) received 179 UAVs.

He expounded a bit on the Supreme CINC:

“The Ground Troops were supplied with two brigade sets of operational-tactical missile systems ‘Iskander-M,’ 294 modernized tanks, 296 other armored combat vehicles, two ‘S-300V4′ Ground Troops air defense systems, almost 5 thousand vehicles.”

“The Air Forces received 142 aircraft, of which 53 are multipurpose Su-30 and Su-35S aircraft systems, 16 Su-34, 28 transport and training aircraft of various types, 18 modernized fighter-interceptors MiG-31BM, 135 helicopters, including 46 combat and 72 transports.”

Mil.ru posted the videos and texts presented to Putin and the collegium.  They address all of the priority tasks of the military this year.  One, of course, is “Equipping with Modern Armaments and Military Equipment.”  It provides the following data (different from Putin and Shoygu):

  • 294 modernized T-72B3;
  • 7 S-400 SAM systems;
  • Yasen-class SSN Severodvinsk (accepted in 2013?!@#) ;
  • Novorossiysk;
  • 5 surface ships and 10 boats / craft of various classes.

This account mentions that the serviceability of weapons and equipment rose from 80 to 85 percent.

Accepting submarines at year’s end seems to enable Moscow to claim that they were accepted, or to count them as “produced,” in two years rather than just one.

All in all, more weapons and equipment were acquired in 2014 and 2013 than in 2012, 2011, etc.  But it’s a little like comparing something and nothing. Serious procurement on a fairly wide front didn’t begin until after 2012.

Defense Sector Wages

Interesting item on wages in Russia’s defense industrial sector in NG on November 11.

Alina Terekhova reports average monthly pay in the OPK is 17 percent higher than the country as a whole.  However, defense industry salaries lag employee earnings in other key sectors (i.e. railroads, oil, finance).  Yet they are likely to grow while wages elsewhere will probably begin to fall.

Minpromtorg [rather optimistically] forecasts that the earnings of OPK workers will double over the coming five years.

Defense industry pay grew 13 percent last year [not entirely consistent with the table below] against almost 12 percent in other areas.

Average Pay in the OPK

Average Pay in the OPK

Earlier this year, workers in Russia’s mining industry made nearly 57,000 rubles per month, oil workers 83,000, railroads 41,000, and finance 67,000.  Pay in the defense industries averaged about 38,000 rubles per month during the first half of 2014, according to Rosstat.  Nationwide it was about 32,000.

That 38,000 seems to fit in the context of other salaries (e.g. 30-35,000 for junior officers and contractees).

Rising inflation, Terekhova reports, could reduce real earnings for everyone next year.

She quotes a couple experts, neither of whom expects a decline in OPK wages. Despite the stagnation evident in the economy, the Kremlin will likely continue funding the GOZ generously given increased tensions with the West.  This will keep upward pressure on defense sector salaries.

It’s interesting that the oft-mentioned “cadre famine” in defense industry hasn’t bid wages higher.  But some enterprises report the average age (and presumably the pay grade) of their workers is dropping with the arrival of new and younger employees.

What’s Been Bought

It’s usually challenging to discover what the Russian military bought in any given year.  But it’s somewhat easier now that procurement is increasing.

Shoygu in the Videoconference (photo: Mil.ru)

Shoygu in the Videoconference (photo: Mil.ru)

On January 14, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu reviewed 2013 procurement in a year-opening videoconference.

He indicated that GOZ-2013 was fulfilled at 96 percent for RDT&E, 93 percent for armament and military equipment purchases, and 91 percent for repairs and servicing.  Purchases increased by 70 percent over 2012.

Beyond that no details.

If Shoygu’s scant and statistical, Topwar.ru’s Kirill Ryabov rescues us.

Ryabov says GOZ-2013 amounted to 1.45 trillion rubles, two-thirds more than 2012.  Roughly the same accounting as Shoygu’s 70 percent.  But Ryabov’s also tracked what was bought.  He doesn’t give full citations for his data.  But it’s a working list.

He starts with air defense:

  • 6 S-400 SAM battalions.
  • 6 Pantsir-S1 missile-gun systems (ZRPKs).
  • 24 Tor-M1-2U SAMs (SA-15 upgrade).
  • 12 Tunguska ZRPKs.

More than 300 combat and support vehicles for the Ground Troops, including:

  • 2 Iskander-M SSM brigades (107th in the Eastern and 1st in the Southern MD).
  • 54 BTR-82A APCs.
  • 12 BMO-T flamethrowers.
  • 90 Tornado and Grad MLRS.
  • 20 Khosta SP guns.
  • 40 Msta-S SP howitzers.
  • 16 Zoopark counterbattery radars.
  • 16 Leyer-2 EW systems.
  • 10 Redut-2US communications systems.

And reportedly more than 5,200 other vehicles and automobiles.

It gets murkier from here on . . . .

For the Air Forces, Ryabov indicates OAK, in 2013, got orders for 60 military aircraft for 62 billion rubles.  Only 35 were reportedly ordered in 2012.

  • 2008 contract for 36 [sic?] Su-34 fighter-bombers was completed in 2013, and Sukhoy started filling the 2012 contract for 92 more.
  • 12 Su-35S were delivered ahead of schedule.
  • 8 Su-30SM, 12 Yak-130 trainers, and an An-140-100 transport were delivered or will be soon (?).

For helicopters:

  • 19 Ka-52 / Alligator.
  • 8 Mi-28N / Night Hunter.
  • 3 Mi-35M.
  • 3 Mi-26.
  • 5 Mi-8AMTSh.
  • 7 Mi-8 (jamming variants).

For the Navy, 12 large and 43 small ships were reportedly launched.  Thirty-five ships and craft of various types were commissioned into the fleet.

Anything more specific requires additional investigation. 

Two Borey-class SSBNs (which can’t perform their primary mission) were accepted for service.  Steregushchiy-class (proyekt 20380) FFL Boykiy joined the Baltic Fleet.

Steregushchiy-class FFL Boykiy (photo: Topwar.ru)

Steregushchiy-class FFL Boykiy (photo: Topwar.ru)

As if on cue, Deputy Defense Minister (armaments chief) Yuriy Borisov held a press-conference on January 16 to discuss last year’s GOZ.

According to him, the Su-35S has not been accepted, but it’s about to be.  Initial deliveries aren’t far behind.  More than 2,200 armored vehicles and other transport means were purchased, and 1,700 modernized.  He said the share of modern armor has reached 24 percent.

The year just past definitely continued the trend of more military procurement from 2012.  But is it enough to get the volume of weapons systems Russia’s military and political leadership wants before 2020?

Remember what procurement lists floated in 2010 looked like:

  • 56 S-400 “units.”
  • 10 S-500 systems.
  • 600 aircraft.
  • 1,000 helicopters.
  • Bulava SLBMs.
  • 20 submarines.
  • 15 frigates.
  • 35 corvettes like Boykiy.
  • Mistral-class amphibious ships.
  • Several new ICBMs.

Even relatively healthy acquisition like GOZ-2013 won’t get to these numbers.

Reaction to Putin’s Armaments Conferences

Actually, one reaction . . . a succinct editorial from Vedomosti capturing many good points with few words.

Vladimir Putin (photo: RIA Novosti / Aleksey Nikolskiy)

Vladimir Putin (photo: RIA Novosti / Aleksey Nikolskiy)

In Sochi last week, President Vladimir Putin conducted a whirlwind three-day series of meetings on Russia’s rearmament programs, giving his primary attention to strategic nuclear ones.

Here’s Vedomosti’s thinking on the sessions:

“Vladimir Putin conducted an intensive series of defense-industrial meetings.  During the trip to Olympic Sochi, the president in turn reviewed the problems of the development of aviation, the fleet, Space Defense Troops [sic] and the Missile Troops of Strategic Designation.  The fact that the discussion of military issues was raised to the highest level, signifies, probably, both the depth of the problems, and the priority of the subject.  The rational use of colossal resources was discussed:  expenditures on defense rose from 600 billion rubles in 2003 to 2.3 trillion rubles in 2013, and the general volume of the State Program of Armaments to 2020 is 20 trillion rubles.”

“These meetings affirmed:  Recent bureaucratic and staff [apparat] decisions, including appointment of a new minister of defense and a “military-industrial” deputy prime minister, did not solve the systemic problems of rearming the army and the quality of work of the domestic VPK.”

“The domestic VPK’s development is frozen, it needs foreign scientific and design developments — both dual-use and exclusively military, observes the director of the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Ruslan Pukhov.  These demands can hardly be satisfied because of constant altercations with Europe and the USA on foreign policy issues.  Moreover, the objective requirement for technological cooperation will contradict Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu’s announced course of refusing imports of foreign armaments, combat equipment and support means (the purchase of the “Mistrals” is the exception proving the rule).  Of course, it is possible to hope that intelligence agents will acquire the needed technologies, as it was in Soviet times.”

“However, even this will not quite forestall the lag:  the institutes and specialists who provided the correct implementation of foreign technologies have been lost.”

“There is still a key question requiring a strategic decision at the highest level, — what is more important:  production of the maximum possible quantity of combat equipment or the training of professionals capable of using the most complex armaments, including foreign-produced ones.  For now, judging by Shoygu’s announcement on the preservation of conscript service, at the top they are inclined toward extensive development, toward employing unpaid labor, the use of which in the army turns into huge losses for households and the economy as a whole.”

“The personal participation of the president is essential in the resolution of conflicts between those who order and suppliers of armaments.  The latter in the absence of competition between various design bureaus and factories (it, as is well-known, existed in the time of the USSR and was one of the engines of the country’s technological development) have become monopolists, not interested in raising quality.  They are sure that the armed forces will buy their products, and know, that in case of disagreements with the military, the directors of state companies from among the closest associates of the first person will turn up on their side.”

Lots of thoughts and propositions for discussion and debate.

Clean Slate

It took a brave man to tell the State Duma what department chief Aleksandr Piskunov said in the Audit Chamber’s annual legislative report in February.  Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer published excerpts of his remarks.

Piskunov’s a government official.  Not a powerful voice, but an authoritative one in his specialty.

Auditor Aleksandr Piskunov

Auditor Aleksandr Piskunov

To say he’s well-equipped for his work is an understatement. 

Sixty-one or 62 years old, Piskunov graduated from the RVSN’s Dzherzhinskiy Military Academy with a radio engineering degree.  He served on active duty to the rank of general-major, spending many years at the Plesetsk cosmodrome.  He later trained in the RF Government’s Financial Academy and a business school in London.  He has a PhD in economics.

Piskunov served in both the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and State Duma in the early 1990s, and was deputy chairman of the Defense Committee for each body.  He also chaired the Defense Ministry’s Military-Technical Policy Committee.  In the mid-1990s, he moved to the staff (apparat) of the RF Government and was deputy chairman of its Committee on Military-Industrial Issues.

He returned to the Duma briefly in 1999, and became deputy chairman of its “Regions of Russia” faction.

He went to the Audit Chamber in 2001, and is currently in his third term of service.

Piskunov thinks Russia can’t produce new, better, or more weapons and military equipment without modernizing its badly neglected defense industrial base.  But he has pretty much nothing but scorn for the current management of the state defense order.  And he sees little but failure in the GPV over the last 20 years.  In particular, Piskunov calls for incorporating life cycle costs into the GPV.  Ultimately, however, he says auditors and accountants can’t fix the GOZ or GPV, but lawmakers could.

Enough preamble.  Here’s VPK’s excerpt of Piskunov’s remarks.

“STRICT CONTROL OF FULFILLING THE ARMAMENTS PROGRAM IS NEEDED”

“I represent a department that performs strategic audits in the Audit Chamber.  We’ve done a lot of work in evaluating the condition of practically all 1,350 enterprises of the defense-industrial complex, their financial stability and real contribution to equipping the Armed Forces.”

“We looked at how balanced the program of defense-industrial complex modernization and State Program of Armaments were.  A gap of 700 billion rubles was observed.  At the same time, 1 trillion 200 billion is built into the budget to guarantee compensation to enterprise directors who go to commercial banks for credits.”

“Similar credit practices are leading to the growth of OPK enterprises with an unstable financial situation.  More than 30 percent are like this.  Only 20 percent come close to world standards in technical equipping.  More than half are in a condition where their restoration is already senseless — it would be better to build from a clean slate.”

“In preparing the law on the state defense order we tried to correct this situation.”

“From my point of view, our system of administering the state defense order is uncompetitive.  The adopted law preserved the situation under which  management amounts to a lag in the state defense order.”

“The deputy prime minister, responsible for the defense-industrial complex, reported that the state defense order was fulfilled by 99 percent as in past years.  But almost one hundred percent fulfillment of state defense orders over the last 20 years has not prevented the failure of all arms programs or fulfilling them at 30, 40, 50 percent.”

“Dmitriy Rogozin himself noted that fulfillment happened because of the appearance of realization.  During the execution of the arms program 7,200 changes were introduced into it, that is the real result is being slanted to agree with this fact.”

“Meanwhile Rogozin recognized that the arms program has gotten old.  The task of preparing a new State Program of Armaments stands before him.  So the problem of forming a legislative basis and management of the State Program of Armaments is more acute than ever.”

“Our opponents in government, having considered it inexpedient to include the management of the acquisition program life cycle in the GOZ law, said it was necessary to include this management in the law on the State Program of Armaments.”

“To me it seems necessary in this instance to hold them to their word — to propose that the government prepare a draft law on the State Program of Armaments.  It’s possible this will allow us to compensate for not realizing it in the GOZ law, and meet the president’s demand to create essential management of the life cycle of weapons systems.  But today the state of affairs is seriously complicated by the fact that the life cycle is really torn into several parts in the Defense Ministry itself.”

“Those who’ve served understand:  you can’t modernize armaments without the experience of using them.  Who really tracks all this life cycle?  It would be logical if Rosoboronpostavka were occupied with this, but it is located at the junction of the functional orderer — a service of the Armed Forces and a contracting firm.  It would be more appropriate to subordinate this department to the government.  It’s perfectly clear that the main risks are connected not to corruption, but to the low qualifications of the orderer.  Someone needs to “hang” over the orderer from the point of view of its responsibility for how both the program and the contract as a unitary whole are being executed.  Juridical responsibility is not rebuilt only through the contract.”

“The level of project management in our ‘defense sector,’ unfortunately, is also very low, especially the quality management system.  We are all witness to what is happening now in space.”

“It’s frightening that it’s impossible to create new equipment without metrics.  We lost the project management culture and stopped training specialists in military academies and schools.  The very best on this plane is OOO ‘KB Sukhoy’ and it used the American experience-plan for metrics on developmental aircraft.  The Americans seized and simply closed the issue — this project is no longer being supported.  To rewrite project documentation now in some kind of domestic variant is complex, therefore the development of these systems is essential.”

“The participation of commercial banks in providing credit for the state defense order is an important question.  Now in the government they are discussing how these 23 trillion will go — through commercial banks, for free or for money?  It’s understood that banks simply don’t work that way.  There is a precedent — the government resolution on the Mariinka, the Bolshoy [theaters], the M-4 [highway].  If you calculate it, then 20 percent received from 23 trillion over these years, it’s necessary to take an additional amount from the taxpayers or cut the defense order by this sum.”

“Not less sensitive is the issue of intermediaries.  If the Defense Ministry and government don’t put transactions under the strictest control, then there are all the calculations on the defense order, life cycle and cooperation levels, we will mess up this program of armaments also.  This, undoubtedly, is one of the most dangerous questions for the Defense Ministry — too large lobbyist forces participating, too large sums going.”

“Questions of managing the life cycle and control of finances are the most fundamental.  The treasury is incapable of resolving this task.”

GPV 2016-2025

Dmitriy Rogozin

Dmitriy Rogozin

Last week Rossiyskaya gazeta’s Sergey Ptichkin reviewed Dmitriy Rogozin’s comments on the formation of the next state armaments program, GPV 2016-2025.  Rogozin is Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) attached to the RF Government.

Rogozin indicated the next GPV will be very different from the current one, according to Ptichkin.

Rogozin said fulfillment of GPV 2016-2025 will be tracked with a new automated system GAS-GOZ, or the State Automated System of the State Defense Order (or perhaps State Automated Defense Order System?).  It’s supposed to allow for “quickly reacting to the smallest failures” in the GOZ.

The Future Research Fund (FPI or ФПИ, the emerging Russian DARPA) will effectively develop the most promising military and civilian technologies in 2016-2025.

Systems now in RDT&E are supposed to be in serial production.  There may be some weapons based on “new physical principles.”

The PAK DA, a new strategic bomber, should be developed and produced during this GPV.  The fifth generation fighter, PAK FA, will be in production.

There will be new missiles, from operational-tactical to strategic, hypersonic ones too.

It’s “not excluded” that aviation-carrying formations (aircraft carriers) will appear in the Navy.

Rogozin said the “active inclusion of the Military-Industrial Commission in developing the future GPV” is a first, and will allow for avoiding “many problems and collisions” along the way.

Rogozin criticized the “former Defense Ministry leadership” for refusing to accept the BTR-90, not ordering the BMD-4, not taking delivery of assembled BMP-3s, and not testing Obyekt 195 (a future tank) after GPV 2011-2020 was already finalized.  Instead, rushed orders for developing and producing the wheeled Bumerang, light tracked Kurganets-25, and heavy tracked Armata ensued. 

These armored vehicles are supposed to enter the force in a year or two, but this seems unlikely.  They will probably become part of GPV 2016-2025.

Rogozin promised the next GPV will be the most balanced, most well-calculated, most innovative, and, at the same time, most realistic.

It’s very early to talk about the next GPV.  Traditionally, this is a sign things aren’t going well in the GOZ or the current GPV.  The overlap in consecutive GPVs makes it difficult (perhaps impossible) for anyone — citizens, lawmakers, bureaucrats, military men, and, defense industrialists — to understand exactly what’s been procured (or not) under each GPV.  This state of confusion probably serves the interests of some of the same  groups.  Rogozin makes it sound as if defense industry, rather than the military, will drive the train this time around.